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Nuclear power: quick dismissal, irrelevant or still indispensable after Fukushima? Stampa E-mail
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by Alessandro Clerici| WEC Chair of Study group Survey of Energy resources and technologies and ABB Spa


             
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E dopo Fukushima? La storia del nucleare sarà tutta da riscrivere (o meglio, da cancellare)? Nonostante - a livello mondiale - l’opinione pubblica sembri fortemente sbilanciata su posizioni... di forte opposizione, ad oggi solo tre nazioni sembrano aver modificato radicalmente i progetti di sviluppo dell’atomo, in essere prima dello tsunami giapponese: la Svizzera (con la sospensione delle procedure di rilascio delle licenze per la costruzione di tre nuovi impianti), l’Italia, l’India. A queste, con ogni probabilità, si aggiungerà lo stesso Giappone.

In merito agli impianti esistenti, le posizioni di Stati Uniti, Germania, e della stessa Ue appaiono oggi decisamente più severe e critiche rispetto a solo un paio di mesi fa. E certamente, per le centrali che vedranno la luce in giro per il mondo nei prossimi anni saranno adottati criteri di sicurezza ulteriormente rafforzati rispetto a quelli odierni.
Ma è tuttavia improbabile che Paesi quali la Cina, la Russia, l’India, la Corea del Sud, la Finlandia, la Romania, la Bulgaria e - perché no - la Gran Bretagna possano modificare sostanzialmente nel medio e lungo termine i programmi di realizzazione di nuove centrali.

In ogni caso, uno scenario estremo (e francamente irrealistico) di fuoriuscita globale dall’atomo si tradurrebbe nella necessità di produrre altrimenti 2.600 TWh l’anno di energia elettrica su scala mondiale (circa 8 volte i consumi annuali dell’Italia), e dunque in un inevitabile incremento dell’utilizzo di fonti fossili nell’ordine dei 700 Mtep l’anno con emissioni addizionali di anidride carbonica par all’8 per cento del totale oggi rilasciato in atmosfera.
Da questo punto di vista, il vero perdente in uno scenario così delineato nel post Fukushima non sarebbe l’energia nucleare, ma il consumatore. E, perché no, anche l’ambiente. Il vero vincitore, potrebbe invece essere il gas naturale, prima ancora di rinnovabili e carbone. da.ca.

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The nuclear history
The first plant connected to a network to deliver energy from peaceful use of nuclear has been in 1954, the 5 MW Obninsk Russian reactor. After that, 3 main periods:

from 1954 to 1975 the installed capacity grew from 0 to 75 GW at around 3,500 MW/year;
from 1975 to 1988 (2 years after Chernobyl) great period of growth, with capacity rising from 75 GW to 300 GW and with peaks of 35 GW/year, 32 and 24 in 1984, 1985 and 1986 respectively;
from 1988 to 2010, in the after Chernobyl era, the installed capacity grew from 300 to 374 GW (+24%), both through new few plants (~4 per year) and through up-grading of existing facilities; but substantial increase of electricity production (+55%) due to very effecttive operation of NPP’s (Nuclear Power Plant) with very reduced planned and unplanned unavailability. This period has placed worldwide the NPP’s, as those with the highest Energy Availability Factor (world average 80% with various countries above 90%).

Just after Chernobyl, nuclear power has been considered in many countries as a dangerous and expensive source of energy but this view has changed in the last decade to a more favourable approach; this is mainly due to the environmental issues connected to greenhouse gas emissions (and nuclear energy is practically CO2 free), to the price volatility of fossil fuels (and the actual or expected long term rise of their current prices after a very depressed period) and to the raising importance of security of supply.

Clearly public acceptance remained a must in many countries but the major concern after 1986 shifted little by little from large accident to final waste disposal. The generation III reactors, safer and in principle more economic and with interesting cost for nuclear energy (including delayed cost for decommissioning and final waste disposal), made their entrance in the market together with a so called nuclear renaissance. For the 31 countries having nuclear plants in operation or under construction, Table 1 summarizes the situation at March 10, 2011, the day before Fukushima. US (104 reactors - 100 GW) and France (56 reactors - 63 GW) are the leading countries and account for over 47% of the global nuclear energy production.

One country (France) has 75% of electric energy from nuclear, 2 countries (Slovakia and Belgium) more than 50% and 12 countries more than 25% (Ukraine, Hungary, Armenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, South Korea, Japan, Finland and Germany). Spain, USA, Russia and UK are at around 20%. In the last 10 years the world nuclear energy production has been practically constant (~2,500 - 2,600 TWh/year) with a share going from 17.1% to 13.4% (see Table 2).

From the same table it is quite apparent that irrespective of the increase of new renewables, electricity production from fossil fuels has seen its share increased from 64.7% to 66.6% as a result of the massive development of coal plants mainly in China (more than 250 MW/day for the last 5 years!). Table 3 for the different continents shows the situation of the reactors in operation and under construction at March 10, 2011 the day before Fukushima. As to nuclear power plants under construction, Asia has a 66% share followed by Europe with 29%. The number of reactors under construction was 65, compared to the 55 of January 15, 2010. The increase is practically from two countries, China (+7) and Russia (+2). In particular, in the last 13 months China has started the construction of 9 reactors (1 reactor every 45 days) and presents the most impressive program with 180 GW envisaged in operation in 2030.


Plants in operation
and their life extension or upgrading

Since both European and North American nuclear plants have been almost amortized, their production cost is less than around 20 €/MWh and this is very competitive compared to the average pool market prices (40-60 €/ MWh in EU 27); therefore extension of life of existing plants is a must, always within safety concerns.
In the United States, that have seen no construction starts since 1977, 65 reactors got the extension up to 60 years and about 90 reactors over the 104 are likely to have life extension up to 60 years. It is interesting to note that various existing nuclear plants have been, or are preparing to be, up-rated to increase their power output, with increases ranging from a few percentage points to ~20%; some thousands of MW of upgrades are under consideration now in US and in other countries. Practically all the European countries having NPP’s are involved in life extension and/or power upgrading programs.


New nuclear power plants
and future prospects before Fukushima

According to WNA, in 47 countries 158 reactors totalling more than 170 GW are planned with defined investments and additional 325 reactors for 370 GW are under consideration. From the economic point of view Table 5 summarises the kWh cost of nuclear compared to gas and coal and with a wide variation of fuels costs and CO2 penalties as could be expected in the next decades as necessary to consider for strategic choices the long life cycle of power plants (40 years for coal and 60 for a new nuclear plant).
Clearly the effect of the economic crisis (lower consumption in many countries), of the impressive shale gas development in US (with relevant impact to lower gas prices), of the Islamic political situation especially in North Africa and finally and mainly of Fukushima will impact the nuclear development in a way difficult to foresee now.


What after Fukushima?
Japan, a land of earthquakes and tsunamis, has been brave or perhaps a bit irresponsible to contribute to its energy independence with a massive nuclear plan started in the Sixties and confirmed just few months ago for its expansion. The nature has taken its revenge with one of the most serious earthquakes which has caused an impressive tsunami with ~17m height waves, far above the envisaged ~6m of the design criteria for the Fukushima plant; the possible deaths due to the tsunami exceed 30,000.
It is today (~2 months after March 10) too premature to draw conclusions on the nuclear disaster and real responsibilities and final impacts; it is necessary to wait for independent reports, for instance from IAEA. Considering the persistent situation in Fukushima, it is not easy to guess a when even for a partial conclusion.
It is important to stress that no human infrastructure/activity has zero risk (transports, industrial sites, energy assets and relevant O&M) but one has on the other hand to recognize the great impact on the people of a nuclear accident, by far more relevant than for other ones. The effects of a nuclear accident could affect very large areas and last for very long times. The reactions of people to something you do not see, you do not know if it has hit you and if and when you may discover it, are clearly very emotional and one has to consider it; it results difficult to counteract these reactions with rational data (higher probability to die in a car accident, etcetera, and with numbers on maximum admissible millisievert, becquerel, etcetera).

Politicians are quite sensitive, not to loose popularity, to show themselves against or conscious of nuclear effects especially close to elections; and we have clear recent examples in Germany and Italy. Energy strategies have second order of priority with respect to perennial consensus tactics. In any case the Fukushima effects, associated with not clear and consistent performance of the involved utility and of the safety nuclear agency, will affect the previously expected world nuclear renaissance. The reactions are and will be clearly different in different countries.
Practically all the countries have declared the importance of a revision of existing standards. At present no modifications in the programs of new plants been officially declared with the exception of:

Switzerland: suspension of the construction license procedures for 3 new reactors.
Italy: cancellation of the recent nuclear law waiting for an EU approach (but main reason has been to avoid the next referendum programmed in June against the same law).
India: new safety law announced by the Government to take care of the Jaitapur dispute for the site of a new NP.
For Japan, the Japanese Prime Minister has said on May 15th: “I think it is necessary to discuss from scratch the current basic energy plan, under which the share of nuclear energy is expected to be more than 50% in 2030 The past energy policy has regarded nuclear energy and fossil fuels as two major pillars in electricity. I would like to add renewable energy and energy saving as two major pillars and to exert further efforts to achieve them, while promoting safety of nuclear energy and reducing carbon dioxide from fossil fuels. Based on these thoughts, I would like to accelerate the discussion on reviewing the overall energy policy".
In China, the government suspended its approval process pending a review of lessons which might be learned from it, particulary regarding siting and control of radiation release. This is expected to be short-term, though it will probably mean delays to the inland AP1000 plants which were due to start construction in 2011.

With reference to existing plants:

In USA, the NRC has said there are no reasons to change the present rules for life extension of NPP’s (and approval for 3 new extensions have been issued just in these weeks).
In Germany the government has decided the temporary closing of the 7 oldest plants and a temporary suspension of the life extension defined with the 2010 law. An ethic committee has been created by Merkel to present a report for May 27, 2011. And the German decisions could affect the behaviour of other countries.
In Japan the government, 2 months after Fukushima, has asked the utility Chubu Electric to close their nuclear plant in Hamaoka situated in an area were are expected earthquakes having magnitudes above 8 level of the Richter scale.
The EU nations have agreed to perform stress tests for existing plants. Possibly the specific events of Fukushima will concentrate the efforts on: re-evaluation of external events and relevant risk connected to the loss of connection to the external network; security of supply of internal emergency energy sources in case of loss of external network; security of heat removal from the reactor after its switching off; qualification of people to deal with possible accidents.

But considering energy is responsibility of the single EU nations, it will be difficult to impose general rules taking care also of the different importance of nuclear on the energy mix (France 75%, Belgium 52%, Germany 27%, Spain 20%, and UK 18%, and so on). For new future plants it is possible in various nations to have more stringent requirements for the choice of sites and for the selection of the most severe external events to be considered, or possible choices of solutions with intrinsic and passive security and/or small reactors or a wait and see for technology development. In any case it will be difficult that countries as China, Russia, India, South Korea, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, and why not UK, could change substantially their programs for new plants.

Someone is also concerned worldwide for the Nuclear Authorities/Agencies to ensure an effective separation between their functions and those of any other body or organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy (and NISA in Japan is an internal unit of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce).
About this it is worth noticing what said by the Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Kan announcing that the government is preparing to launch a committee dedicated to investigating the cause of the Fukushima nuclear accident. The new committee, he said, would be independent from the existing nuclear energy administration. Its findings would be made available to the public and the international community and would cover not only the technical aspects of the accident, but also the existing systems and the structure of institutions.

In any case the Fukushima event has clearly brought again in first place after 25 years from Chernobyl the safety of nuclear plants and the possible effects of large accidents. Emotional decisions in the short term could cause:

New approach to reduce the number of reactors per site (in Fukushima 6 reactors now, with 2 new ones to be built!).
Increased electricity generation from fossil fuels.
Increased problems for security of supply.
Higher electricity prices.
Higher CO2 emissions.

And this as a consequence of:
More critical selection of possible sites of new NPP’s.
Longer permission times.
Increased cost of new and existing NPP’s for increased security/safety rules.
Increased costs of risk insurances.
Reduced utilization of existing nuclear plants or even closure.

As an extreme and unrealistic case the shutdown of the present 2,600 TWh production worldwide from nuclear plants would mean:
Additional consumption of 700 MTEP/year of fossil fuels (25-30% of present global gas production).
Additional emissions of 2 bt CO2/per year (8% of present global), and this would be difficult to absorb even in many years.

The possible real looser from Fukushima, as a result of emotional decisions, would not be nuclear energy but final consumers (higher electricity costs) and the environment. Big winner could be gas, and to a lesser extent (according to UBS) coal and renewables. In any case the real dilemma is how to react to 3 main risks and to balance them:

Risk of nuclear accident.
Risk of environmental collapse for CO2 emissions connected to fossil fuels burning.
Risk to stop social-economic development especially in LDC’s where 1.6 million of people is still with no electricity.

As a conclusion, for the long term (and the energy sector has a life cycle of some decades or even a century, by far longer than the 4-5 years of national governments) the WEC position to consider all the possible sources of energy with no one demonized or worshipped is still valid. The role of nuclear cannot be easily cancelled and substituted by volatile and presently expensive renewables which need for their operation spare and programmable capacity, up to the time competitive energy storage would be available.

 
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